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Abstract 
This case is intended to illustrate key trade-offs in planning the acquisition of 
a major weapon system.  In particular, the impact of logistics and maintenance 
decisions on life-cycle costs and readiness are examined.  The case provides 
sufficient data to allow a rich discussion of issues and trade-offs—without being 
overwhelming.  The case raises strategic policy issues but provides an analytical 
framework and data so that the policy issues can be discussed in detail, and not 
merely with generalities. 
Logistics and maintenance issues examined within the case include the 
critical protection (spare-part) levels and reliability of major components, depot and 
preventive maintenance turnaround times, as well as planning for exogenous factors 
such as variability in the price of petroleum, oil, and lubricants.  By examining a set 
of related decisions simultaneously, the case allows students to explore the relative 
leverage of logistics and maintenance decisions on cost and readiness.  By 
examining endogenous as well as exogenous factors, the case allows students to 
examine the impact of factors within the control of program managers as well the 
impact of factors beyond their control on budget and readiness risk.  The intent of 
the case is to move beyond planning simple budget and readiness targets and to 
encourage students to discuss methods of robust contingency planning.  
Specific learning objectives include 
 an understanding of the life-cycle cost implications of logistics and 
maintenance decisions, 
 an understanding of the readiness implications of logistics and 
maintenance decisions, 
 an understanding of the trade-offs between life-cycle cost and 
readiness, 
 an understanding of the implications of logistics and maintenance 
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 an understanding of the implications of logistics and maintenance 
factors on budget risk. 
The development of this case was supported by the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  This case was prepared by Dr. Keebom Kang and Dr. Kenneth Doerr for 
use in Dr. Kang’s Logistics Engineering class at the Naval Postgraduate School.  A 
teaching note is available for instructors at educational institutions by requesting a 
copy from Dr. Kang.       
Keywords: life-cycle cost analysis; major weapon system;  risk analysis on 
readiness and budget, spare parts critical protection levels; inventory fill rates;  
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I. Introduction 
Given the looming controversies over the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a small 
group of naval acquisition mavericks began meeting in secret to discuss the 
development of an alternative aircraft that would incorporate many of the state-of-
the-art technologies of the JSF but would be dedicated to the narrower missions of 
the Navy and Marines.  Unlike past design projects, the aircraft would have cost 
targets, and especially ownership cost targets, as a primary design criteria.  The 
secret group called themselves the F-Team, reflecting either their focus on fighter 
aircraft or the grades they received in graduate school. 
Knowing that the project would be doomed to failure without the design and 
manufacturing support that industry could provide, the F-Team used its contacts in 
the Aerospace Industry Association (AIA) to reach out to like-minded individuals 
from multiple defense companies.  These defense company engineers were 
dedicated to rescuing the tarnished image of their profession by developing a design 
for an affordable, state-of-the-art aircraft in record time.   They took as their role 
model the North American Aviation team that had designed and built the P-51 
Mustang aircraft prototype (arguably the best American fighter aircraft in World War 
II) in 100 days. 
The F-Team had assembled the skills it needed for its project, but it still 
needed development funding.  It knew that seeking funds through official channels 
would kill the project.  The AIA professionals needed resources.  The F-Team 
needed $2 billion in a hurry.  It was then that Bill Gates came to his nation’s rescue.  
Retiring from Microsoft, he secretly hired an actor to play the part of CEO so that he 
could pursue his dream of helping the nation’s defense.  Under the guise of a 
humble business school dean at the Naval Postgraduate School, the “real” Bill Gates 
devoted his considerable business acumen to managing the secret project, funded 
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The project has now reached a critical stage, and it is time to go public with a 
business plan that the nation’s civilian and defense leaders can review.  In this hour 
of need, Dean Gates has reached out to your project group (which, for some reason, 
he has dubbed the D-Team) to develop the business case analysis to be submitted 
for public scrutiny.  Defenders of the status quo will be merciless in their review of 
your work.  Your analysis must be thorough, precise, and exhaustive.  The nation’s 
future may depend on how you perform this task. 
The data you need are all described as follows.  You must use this data to 
predict yearly costs and life-cycle costs for the new aircraft.  The public is weary of 
cost overruns on projects like these, so you must not only project a budgeted life-
cycle cost but also assess the risk that the projected cost will be exceeded. 
Although the technical design of the aircraft is complete, several design 
alternatives are still available for critical components.  They involve, for example, the 
ability to invest in more expensive materials in order to reduce wear on a 
component, and hence, lengthen the mean time between failures (MTBF) for those 
components.  Also, design of the logistics support process is not complete.  Key 
decisions such as the proper spare-parts inventory level for critical components must 
still be made.  Dean Gates looks to your project group, as logistics experts, to 
complete the design of the support processes for the aircraft.   
Typically, a small number of components contribute to most of the major 
logistics costs and degradation of readiness.  For this case study, you will consider 
only six components (as shown in the next section) for life-cycle cost and operational 
availability computation, assuming that these are major readiness degraders and 
high-cost items.   
With the logistics process and key component reliability still in play, life-cycle 
costs of course cannot yet be determined.  It will be possible to reduce up-front 
costs—and possibly life-cycle costs—by reducing reliability and availability of 
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and, hence, the availability of the aircraft.  But you must keep in mind that planning 
for military operations will assume a certain guaranteed level of availability for this 
aircraft.  You must set that “planning threshold” for operational availability and also 
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II. The F-XX 
The new aircraft that the F-Team has designed is code-named the F-XX.  It is 
a single-pilot, single-engine weapon system.  Its mission profile is classified.  The F-
XX program life cycle is estimated to be 35 years (beginning in the current year), 
with an operational life of 30 years (beginning four years from now).  As aircraft are 
brought into service and lost (attrited), the effective operating life of a single aircraft 
will average 27 years.  
The following six life-cycle cost categories should be covered in your analysis: 
1. research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); 
2. procurement/production; 
3. personnel;  
4. training; 
5. operations and maintenance (O&M), including preventative 
maintenance and mid-life component improvement plan (CIP); and 
6. squadron stand up and phase out costs, including disposal cost and 
salvage value.   
All dollar values that appear in this case study are in current-year constant dollars.  The current year is designated 
FY00, the next year is designated FY01, and so forth.   
A. Research, Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
RDT&E Costs: FY00  $150,000,000 
FY01  $175,000,000 
FY02  $200,000,000 
FY03  $200,000,000 
Initial year RDT&E costs can be taken as a constant.  Subject matter experts 
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B. Procurement and Production 
Production Time Line: Begins in FY03 (F-XXs will be fielded in the year 
following their production). 
Total Aircraft Produced: 96 aircraft 
Annual Production: 24 aircraft 
Production Costs:  
Unit Procurement Cost: $50,000,000 
Support Equipment  $20,000 per aircraft 
Each copy of the F-XX has an average unit cost of $50 million. Support 
equipment costs $20,000 per aircraft.  These one-time costs are incurred when the 
F-XXs are phased into the squadrons.    
Your life-cycle cost model does not need to incorporate factors such as 
reductions in unit cost attributable to learning curve theory and economies of scale, 
nor does it need to consider potential cost overruns due to change orders later in the 
life cycle.  The $50 million unit cost is the best-estimate average unit cost of all F-XX 
aircraft produced across the life cycle, accounting for those factors.   
If the F-XX production line closed and were reopened later in the life cycle, it 
would likely incur significant setup cost.  However, it is reasonable to assume that 
the production will be open for many years, since these aircraft will be sold to allied 
countries in the future. (See the Squadron Stand up and Phase Out Plan section.) 
C. Squadron Manning and Personnel Costs 
The F-XX aircraft system will be set up with eight squadrons.  Two squadrons 
on each coast of the continental U.S. (CONUS), and one squadron each for the 
Pacific, Indian, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Oceans will be stood up to 
accommodate the new system. Each squadron will have a total of 12 aircraft. 
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Pilots and Ground Support Personnel (per squadron): 
-   17 Pilots 
-     4 Ground Support Officers 
-   16 Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) 
- 176  Enlisted 
 
Headquarters Personnel (per squadron): 
- 2  Commanding Officer (CO) and Executive officer (XO) (both are 
pilots) 
- 1 Administration Officer (non-pilot) 
- 2 CPOs 
- 4 Enlisted 
Average Personnel Cost per Year (cost to the DoD):  
- Pilot Officer  $180,000 
- Ground Officer $160,000 
- CPO   $110,000 
- Enlisted (E1 to E6) $60,000 
See http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2013/2013_k.pdf for the 
DoD standard composite pay that includes standard benefits (housing, food, 
medical, etc., not including re-enlistment bonuses, combat pay, etc.).    
D. Training Requirements and Costs 
All F-XX personnel will require both basic and advanced levels of training.  To 
meet the requirements to fill an assigned billet, each person must be fully qualified in 
accordance with the designated Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC) or Navy 
Officer Designator and pilots must complete all levels of flight training.  The 
squadron CO and the XO are both pilots.   It is assumed that these two senior 
officers (CO and XO) have previously completed basic flight training and that they 
only need to go through the advanced pilot training.  They also will take 
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The manpower annual turnover rate is 20%, and additional personnel must be 
trained due to attrition.  The initial training will start one year prior to squadron 
activation, and the training program will be closed by the end of FY30.  The man 
power turnover rate at the beginning of the life cycle would be lower than 20%, but 
we will assume a flat rate of 20% per year once the initial training cycle starts.  
Required training time and costs are as follows: 
Pilots and Ground Personnel 
Basic   Advanced 
Officer 
Pilot 36 weeks 12 weeks 
Ground 12 weeks 2 weeks 
CPO 12 weeks 2 weeks 
Junior Enlisted 24 weeks 24 weeks 
Headquarters Personnel 
Basic Administration Training (Officers, CPOs, junior enlisted): 10  weeks 
Advanced Administration Training (Officers and CPOs):    3  weeks 
Training Costs (including travel and per diem)  
Basic Training:     $2,000 / person / week 
Advanced Training: $3,000 / person / week 
Pilot Basic: $11,000 / person / week  
Pilot Advanced: $11,000 / person / week 
E. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
Operations 
F-XX Flying Hours per Aircraft  40 hrs/month, or 480 hrs/year 
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Corrective Maintenance (CM) 
The MTBF, cost, and required protection level (spare fill rate, or customer 
service level) for some of the major components are as follows: 
Component Name MTBF Criticality Protection Level Unit Cost 
APU 250 Non-Critical 0.85 $100,000 
GEN 400 Critical 0.95 $ 250,000 
PAS 1000 Critical 0.95 $ 400,000 
AC 1000 Critical 0.95 $ 500,000 
LG 500 Critical 0.95 $ 400,000 
ENG 500 Critical 0.95 $ 2,000,000 
 
APU: Auxiliary Power Unit 
GEN:  Generator 
PAS:  Phased Array System (Radar)  
AC:  Avionic Computer 
LG:  Landing Gear 
ENG:  Engine 
Management of spare parts will be on a one-for-one exchange at the 
squadron level (organizational level, or O-level).  It takes two days to swap the failed 
component with a spare part, if the part is available.  For a critical component failure, 
the aircraft will be grounded until a ready-for-issue (RFI) spare part becomes 
available.  An average waiting time for an RFI spare part is assumed to be 50% of 
the depot repair turnaround time.  A failed component is sent to the Navy depot or 
contractor-managed depot for repair.  The required O&M factors are as follows: 
Each squadron’s activity has start-up fixed costs, which are incurred at 
$10,000,000 per activity prior to squadron activation.  Additionally, operating variable 
costs, which are estimated at $5,000,000/year per O-level activity, are incurred for 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 10 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Transportation Cost:   $200 per failure  
Spare Inventory Carrying Rate:  20% of spare value per year 
(Including Purchase and Depreciation) 
Sparing Levels (Protection Levels) 
Critical Units    95% 
Non-Critical Units   85% 
Repair Turnaround Time (TAT)  40 days 
Depot-Level Repair Costs   $5,000 per repair 
O-Level Activation $10,000,000 for each O-Level 
activity 
O-Level Operating Costs   $5,000,000/yr per squadron 
Some uncertainty remains in certain O&M factors.  Engineers from F-Team 
have proposed alternatives that involve additional up-front investments that can 
potentially lower turnaround times and increase MTBF for critical components to 
improve readiness and reduce the life-cycle cost.   
Preventative Maintenance (PM)  
Cost  10% of aircraft procurement cost 
Interval 5 years 
TAT  90 days 
Mid-life Component Improvement Plan (CIP) 
Mid-life CIP  Begins in FY18  
2 squadrons per year 
CIP Costs  25% of aircraft procurement cost +  
4% of aircraft procurement cost for engineering 
RDT&E 
Interval  Scheduled once during the life cycle per aircraft 
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F. Squadron Stand-up and Phase-Out Plan 
The F-XX squadrons will be stood up and stood down two squadrons at a 
time with the following time line: 
Stand up:  FY04: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY05: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY06: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY07: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
Decommission: FY31: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY32: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY33: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY34: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
We assume that all aircraft will be in full operational mode at the beginning of 
the fiscal year when a squadron stands up; for example, 24 aircraft will be in 
operation in FY04 for the entire year.  We also assume that the aircraft will be 
decommissioned at the end of the fiscal year.   
 As squadrons stand down, the assigned aircraft will be sold to foreign military 
sales (FMS)–eligible countries.  The expected salvage value of each aircraft is $12.5 
million, 25% of the average procurement unit cost.   The savage value as well as 
disposal costs, if any, will be realized at the time of decommissioning.  Classified 
weapon systems will be removed before the FMS sales.  This disposal cost is 
estimated to be $250,000 per aircraft.     
Ten additional aircraft will be purchased in FY07 as replacement aircraft that 
will be available as a one-to-one exchange when an aircraft is sent to depot for 
overhaul and CIP.  An attrited aircraft will be replaced as needed at a future time.  
The average attrition rate is estimated to be approximately 1% per year.  For 
modeling purposes, we assume that one aircraft will need to be delivered every year 
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The procurement and maintenance costs of the training aircraft will not be 
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III. Case Questions 
1. Estimate the life-cycle cost (or total ownership cost) for the F-XX 
system using the real annual discount rates at 2% and 7% per year, 
respectively.   
 (See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a094.html) 
2. Estimate operational availability of the F-XX aircraft squadron.  Add 
your own reasonable assumptions as needed.   
3. Re-compute the life-cycle cost with the assumption that the O&M costs 
are expected to creep with aging in excess of inflation at a rate of 4% 
annually, starting from the 11th year of operation (FY14).  The CIP cost 
will remain the same as estimated.   
4. Develop five what-if scenarios that a decision-maker (e.g., program 
manager) would be interested in.  For example, if the critical spare 
parts protection level is changed from 95% to 85% and, at the same 
time, the depot (repair) turnaround time is increased from 40 days to 
50 days, what is the impact on the life-cycle cost and operational 
availability?  
5. Estimate the probability that the life-cycle cost will exceed some 
threshold value—say, $17 billion (discounted cash flow). 
6. Estimate the probability that the operational availability falls below 
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